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their view, the improbability of one-party 
majorities under MMP provides a needed 
check on the leading party by compelling 
it to negotiate and compromise with 
smaller parties and thus produces 
better-considered, wiser, more moderate 
policies.
Representational fairness, in contrast, 
was a value that cut only one way, in 
favour of MMP. Because it allocates 
list seats by a compensatory formula, 
MMP is designed to ensure proportional 
representation (PR) for all parties that 
meet the party vote threshold or win an 
electorate seat, and no one disputed that it 
has fulfilled that promise. Besides fairness 
to parties, MMP also indirectly promotes 
more nearly proportional representation 
for ethnic minorities and women because 
parties have an incentive and a means 
to appeal for their party votes through 
nominations to lists. MMP, combined 
with retention of dedicated Mäori seats, 
has consistently elected Mäori MPs in 
numbers roughly commensurate to the 
Mäori population. MMP has also helped 
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Both opponents and defenders of 
MMP treated governmental strength as 
an important consideration, but they 
assessed it differently. Advocates of change 
favoured the first-past-the-post (FPP) or 
supplementary member (SM) alternatives 
because they believed either would 
deliver a higher probability of single-
party majority governments. Under FPP 
ministries not requiring bargaining across 
party lines would form quickly after 
elections, avoid concessions to minor-
party ‘kingmakers’, act decisively to solve 
policy problems, and remain stable until 
the next election, when voters could 
hold them unambiguously accountable 
for performance in office. Supporters of 
MMP countered that the excessive power 
of one-party governments (‘elective 
dictatorships’) in 1984–1993 was a major 
reason why voters had chosen MMP over 
FPP in the 1992 and 1993 referendums. In 
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elect higher percentages of women, 
Pasifika and Asian MPs. For many 
supporters of MMP, representational 
fairness is the primary goal and virtue of 
the system. Opponents did not attack this 
attribute, but they obviously gave it less 
weight. The decision of the Campaign 
for Change to support SM rather than 
FPP as the preferred alternative to MMP 
was no doubt a bow to the value of 
diversity in representation, but at a less 
than proportional level, so as to produce 
a greater likelihood of strong, one-party 
governments.
Discussions framed by the alleged 
trade-off between effective government 
and fair representation have been typical in 
debates over electoral systems worldwide. 
Both values are certainly important. From 
the viewpoint of modern democratic 
theory, however, one must apply four 
additional tests in order to evaluate the 
performance of any electoral system: (1) 
Do majorities rule? (2) Do governments 
represent the median voter? (3) Are there 
any permanent minorities or any parties 
perpetually in power? (4) Do minorities 
impose centrifugal policies?
Do majorities rule?
The real issue at stake in debates over 
governmental power is not so much 
whether the government is too strong 
or too weak, but whether the policies it 
enacts enjoy sufficient support outside 
Parliament. Although the FPP voting 
system is often justified (and analysed) 
in terms of majority rule, it awards every 
seat to the candidate winning a mere 
plurality of votes in the electorate, which 
need not be a true majority unless there 
are only two candidates.1 When minor 
parties receive a non-trivial share of votes, 
as was true of every New Zealand election 
from 1954 on, the aggregation of plurality 
victories across the country typically 
‘manufactures’ a parliamentary majority 
for the winning party, even though it may 
have received the support of less – often 
much less – than a majority of voters.2 
After the last six elections under FPP 
(1978–1993), over-representation of the 
governing party (it was always a single 
party) ranged from a low of 22% in 1987 
to a high of 45% in 1990, with a mean of 
37%.3 As Jack Vowles (1991) elegantly put 
it: ‘The essential flaw in our present [FPP] 
arrangements is a simple one: power is 
given to minorities who think they have 
a majority.’ In contrast, although MMP 
does not guarantee perfectly proportional 
representation, it has dramatically reduced 
the boost given to the governing party or 
coalition. Their over-representation after 
the first six MMP elections ranged from a 
high of 8% for the first MMP government 
in 1996 down to zero in 2005, with an 
average of 4.7%.
Over-representation of the govern-
ment means that legislative majorities 
can rest on electoral bases comprising 
less – sometimes much less – than a 
majority of voters. Figure 1 illustrates 
this phenomenon, again comparing 
parliaments after the last six FPP elections 
with those after the first six elections 
under MMP. On the assumption that 
parties vote as unified blocs, the graph 
displays the percentage of popular 
votes received by the party or parties 
comprising a minimal parliamentary 
majority (also known as a ‘minimum 
winning coalition’).4 Under FPP, a single 
party always had a majority of MPs in 
the immediate post-election period. The 
votes received by those governing parties 
ranged from near-majorities of 48% for 
Labour in 1987 and 47.8% for National 
in 1990 down to just 35.1% for National 
in 1993. Under MMP the figure becomes 
more complicated, because no majority 
government has formed except for the 
initial coalition of National and New 
Zealand First in 1996, which had a bare 
majority of 61 seats. To pass any bill, a 
minority government must depend on 
votes (or abstentions) from another party 
or parties. Most minority governments 
have had agreements of support or co-
operation with more than one small party. 
The graph shows the electoral support 
for all the minimal winning coalitions 
a government could form with the aid 
of one or more of those minor parties 
(though of course some bills enjoyed 
broader assent). In 2008, for example, 
the bottom of the vertical line represents 
a parliamentary majority consisting of 
National and the Mäori Party, which 
together received 47.3% of the party vote. 
The top of the line shows the vote for a 
legislative majority consisting of National 
and the Green Party, with which National 
had an agreement of co-operation, albeit 
a very limited one. Together they won 
51.7% of party votes. The circle shows the 
mean popular support for all minimal 
legislative majorities that the National 
government could achieve, which was 
49.2%.5 
In the last six elections under FPP, 
the electoral support for parliamentary 
majorities fluctuated widely, but never 
reached an absolute majority. Its average 
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level was just 42.1%. In contrast, in the 
six MMP elections, popular support for 
minimal legislative majorities has been 
tightly clustered around the 50% line 
with an average level of 49.8%. Thus, if 
MMP has not always delivered rule by 
strict electoral majorities, it has certainly 
come very close.
Do governments receive support from the 
median voter?
Another way of getting at the question 
of majority rule is via the concept of the 
median voter, which plays an important 
role in democratic theory. If voters’ 
ideological preferences can be arranged 
along a one-dimensional spectrum – for 
example, from left to right – then the 
median voter occupies a position such 
that equal numbers of other voters are 
to the left and right of that individual. 
The position favoured by the median 
voter ought to win, according to a widely 
accepted test for majority rule known 
as the Condorcet criterion. That is, if 
voters were asked to choose between the 
median position and any other point on 
the spectrum in a series of one-on-one 
votes, a majority would always choose 
the median. A longstanding argument 
in favour of FPP held that pragmatic 
politicians would in fact converge toward 
the magical median, thus delivering the 
outcome that theorists believed should 
happen (Downs, 1957). Unfortunately, 
recent evidence from comparative politics 
shows that FPP systems on the whole 
perform less well than PR according to the 
median test (Powell, 2000; McDonald and 
Budge, 2005). Scholars have advanced a 
variety of reasons (not mutually exclusive) 
that might explain why major-party 
leaders under FPP do not consistently 
adopt policies favoured by the median 
voter: a third party (such as the Liberal 
Democrats in Britain) may occupy the 
centre ground; internal party nomination 
processes (such as party primaries in the 
US) may pull candidates away from the 
centre; strategists may fear that ideological 
voters, funders or activists will abstain or 
defect to extremist minor parties if they 
are not offered ‘a choice rather than an 
echo’; and leaders themselves may be 
ideological ‘conviction’ politicians rather 
than opportunistic office-seekers.
How has New Zealand performed 
according to the median-voter test under 
FPP and MPP? To answer this question 
requires two strong assumptions: 
1) We must be willing to arrange parties 
along a single dimension, which 
in this analysis will be left–right 
positions on major economic policy 
issues. Clearly, parties often appeal 
to voters by taking stands on cross-
cutting non-economic issues – e.g., 
environmental, social and cultural 
policies, law and order, foreign policy, 
Mäori rights. Nevertheless, in New 
Zealand as in many other democracies 
the economic dimension is dominant 
in most elections. Figure 2 shows the 
left–right economic positions that I 
posit for all significant parties that 
contested one or more elections from 
1978 to 2011 – as before, the last six 
under FPP and the first six under 
MMP.
2) We must assume that the left-right 
policy preferences of voters correspond 
to the positions of the parties they 
vote for. Again, this is obviously not 
true in many instances: voters may 
choose according to non-economic 
issues, their liking for party leaders, or 
the overall state of the economy; but 
this assumption also seems reasonable 
as a first approximation, for purposes 
of a broad-brush analysis. 
Drawing on those two assumptions 
and the vote totals received by parties 
enables us to determine the party chosen 
by the median voter in each election.6 In 
Table 1, the first column lists those parties. 
Subsequent columns answer three tests 
of whether the median voter’s position 
was likely to influence legislation: First, 
was the party of the median voter 
also the party of the median MP on 
conventional left-right issues? Second, 
was the party favoured by the median 
voter a party of government, either as a 
one-party government or as a member 
of a coalition? Third, if the median 
voter’s party was not in government, did 
it sign a formal agreement of support or 
co-operation with the government? 
As Table 1 shows, not one of the last six 
parliaments under FPP satisfied any of the 
median-voter tests. In five instances the 
median position was occupied by Social 
Credit or its successor, the Democrats.7 In 
the final FPP election, one of the major 
parties – Labour – finally won the median 
mandate; but because the majority 
favouring the left and centre-left was split 
between the Alliance (18.2%) and Labour 
(34.7%), National emerged with a bare 
plurality of votes (35.1%) and an equally 
bare majority of MPs (50 of 99). 
The record under MMP is 
dramatically different. After the first four 
MMP elections, the party of the median 
voter was both the party of the median 
MP and a party of government. In 2008, 
Figure 2: Left–right ordering on economic policy dimension of parties contesting elections in 1978–2011 
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tiny United Future was the party of 
the median voter in the electorate, but 
National was the party of the median MP 
as well as the main party of government. 
United Future’s sole MP, Peter Dunne, 
wielded some influence through a 
support agreement with National which 
gave him two portfolios outside cabinet, 
as minister of revenue and associate 
minister of health. In 2011 United Future 
and National swapped the median 
distinctions, while National remained in 
government. 
Are there permanent minorities or perpetual 
parties of government?
Although rule by majorities is a key 
test of democracy, the case for majority 
rule breaks down – both morally and 
practically – if any significant minority 
never shares in power. MMP guarantees 
minority parties a proportionate share 
of seats (if they surpass either of two 
thresholds), but fair representation for 
minorities is merely symbolic if they 
never achieve substantial influence over 
policy. Of course, after any given election 
or on any given legislative vote there will 
be winners and losers – a majority and 
a minority; but over time there should 
be multiple and changing majorities, 
so that every majority is temporary 
and no minority is permanent, thus 
providing every group or interest with 
opportunities to influence policy and 
a stake in the political system (Miller, 
1983; McGann, 2006). Assessing the 
health of democracy in this dynamic 
sense requires experience over time, 
which New Zealand has acquired after 
six elections under MMP.
Table 2 demonstrates the sharing of 
influence since the introduction of MMP. 
The cells record the number of years 
following each election in which a group 
represented in Parliament enjoyed some 
influence over policy, either as part of a 
governing coalition (bold numerals) or 
through a formal agreement of support or 
co-operation with a minority government 
(italic numerals). The first eight rows 
represent political parties. The last row 
attempts to assess the influence of Mäori 
as a group by tracking the participation 
in governments of MPs representing 
Mäori electorates. There were, of course, 
other Mäori MPs elected from party lists 
or (less often) general electorates, but 
members elected from Mäori electorates, 
whether or not they stood as candidates 
of a predominantly Mäori party, should 
be especially attuned to, and inclined 
to advocate, the distinctive interests 
of Mäori people. In years when more 
than one party elected MPs in Mäori 
constituencies, the table credits Mäori 
Table 2: Years as part of government or ally of government
Party or group 1996–
1999
1999–
2002
2002–
2005
2005–
2008
2008–
2011
2011–
2012/14
Years with 
influence
to 2012
Years with 
influence 
projected to 
2014
ACT 1 0 0 0 3 1/3 31% 39%
National 3 0 0 0 3 1/3 44% 50%
United Future 1 0 3 3 3 1/3 69% 72%
NZ First 2 0 0 3 x 0/0 31% 28%
Labour 0 3 3 3 0 0/0 56% 50%
Alliance/
Progressive/
Mana
0 3 3 3 0 0 56% 50%
Greens 0 3 3 3 3 0/0 75% 67%
Ma-ori Party x x 0 0 3 1/3 50%* 60%*
MPs from Ma-ori 
electorates
2 + 1** 3 2+1** 3** 3** 1**/3** 100% 100%
Bold: years as governing party or member of governing coalition
Italic:  years with formal agreement of support or co-operation with government
x: not represented in Parliament during this period
* Ma-ori Party percentages based on years since 2004, when the party was founded.
** MPs representing Ma-ori electorates were sometimes from more than one party. In years marked by double asterisks, some MPs 
representing Ma-ori electorates had ties to government and some did not. See note 8
Sources: Malone, 2008, pp.46-7; Boston, 2011, pp.92-9; Miller and Curtin, 2011, p.112; plus news articles for 2011–.
Table 1: Influence of the median voter after elections under FPP and MMP
Election
Party chosen by 
the median voter
Was the party of the median voter...
the party of the 
median MP? 
a party of 
government?
a party supporting or 
co-operating with the 
government?
1978 Social Credit NO NO NO
1981 Social Credit NO NO NO
1984 Social Credit NO NO NO
1987 Democrats NO NO NO
1990 Democrats NO NO NO
1993 Labour NO NO NO
1996 NZ First YES YES  – 
1999 Labour YES YES  – 
2002 Labour YES YES  – 
2005 Labour YES YES  – 
2008 United Future NO NO YES
2011 National NO YES  – 
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with influence if any of those MPs were 
members of a governing party or a 
party supporting or co-operating with 
government.8
By scanning across the first eight 
rows of the table, one can readily see 
that all of the eight political parties 
have enjoyed periods of influence as a 
governing, supporting or co-operating 
party. In other words, no party has been a 
permanent minority, perpetually denied 
influence. The experience of Mäori under 
MMP is even more impressive. As the last 
row of Table 2 shows, at least some MPs 
representing Mäori electorates have been 
members of governing or allied parties 
continuously since the inception of 
MMP. The final two columns summarise 
the record by showing the percentage 
of time that each party and members 
from Mäori seats have had influence 
over government. The first of these 
columns covers 1996–2012, assuming 
that the National-led government elected 
in 2011 and its agreements with other 
parties remain effective for a year. The 
final column projects to 2014 on the 
assumption that current arrangements 
continue for the better part of three 
years, until a new election after a normal 
parliamentary term. 
Not only has no party been 
permanently excluded, but also the 
sharing of power over time has been 
remarkably even. If the current alignment 
continues until 2014, the smallest share of 
time with influence for parties that existed 
in 1996 will be 28% for New Zealand First 
(or 33% excluding 2008–11, when the 
party had no MPs). The largest share is 
United Future’s 72%. Three other parties, 
including National and Labour, will be 
at 50%. The corollary of these results is 
that no party has been perpetually in 
government. Although partisans mourn 
when their favourites are relegated to 
the opposition benches, the expectation 
that a party will always have power tends 
to breed complacency, opportunism 
and corruption. The fact that the two 
major parties have been equally often 
in government and opposition should 
be taken as a sign of the health of New 
Zealand democracy under MMP. It is also 
desirable that no smaller party or parties 
be perpetually in power. United Future’s 
72% is offset by the fact that for more 
than half of that time the party had only 
one MP, the durable Peter Dunne. As for 
the seemingly permanent incorporation 
of MPs representing Mäori electorates, 
that can be seen against the larger context 
of the 129 years before MMP, when Mäori 
were usually under-represented and 
marginalised. The continuous influence 
of Mäori MPs over ministries has brought 
little danger of stagnation, because those 
Mäori members have belonged to four 
different parties.
Do minorities impose centrifugal policies?
In one situation, minor-party influence 
over policies is entirely consistent with 
majority rule. That is the case when the 
minor party occupies the median position 
on an issue dimension and uses its voting 
power – either as a coalition partner or 
as an ad hoc ally on a particular bill – to 
moderate a relatively extreme policy that 
one of the major parties would otherwise 
prefer. In this scenario, the influence of the 
minor party enables an outcome closer 
to the preference of the median voter to 
prevail. Since the advent of MMP, both 
New Zealand First and United Future (in 
its various incarnations) have tried to play 
the centrist role on the main left–right 
spectrum.
Often, however, minor parties espouse 
policies that a majority would not 
endorse. Some stake out positions on the 
flanks of the primary dimension: ACT on 
the right, the Alliance/Progressives on the 
left. Frequently, small parties attract their 
most intense support by emphasising 
issues that cut across the conventional 
left–right dimension. For some minor 
parties, the cross-cutting dimension 
is their raison d’être and the source of 
their identity as a party. Environmental 
and related ‘post-materialist’ issues 
play that role for the Greens, as have 
Mäori concerns for several parties. In 
other cases, minor parties with a well-
defined left–right identity try (perhaps 
opportunistically) to attract additional 
support by also taking up a cross-cutting 
issue – immigration for New Zealand 
First in 1996, social conservatism for 
United Future in 2002, and law and order 
for ACT in 2008.
When a small party advocates non-
majoritarian policies, it is not undesirable 
for it to win some concessions. If such 
a party continually had no success, the 
voters who support it could become 
permanently aggrieved, isolated and 
alienated from the body politic. In New 
Zealand, that danger is most obvious 
with respect to Mäori as a visible and 
self-conscious minority, but it could also 
apply to other groups who feel intensely 
about their concerns. On the other 
hand, if small parties exploit favourable 
bargaining positions to impose undiluted 
versions of their preferred policies, 
thus causing great distress among the 
majority, then their power is dangerous 
to the polity and difficult to defend from 
the viewpoint of democratic theory. A 
conspicuous contemporary example of 
this problem in a PR system is the ability 
of Shas and other ultra-orthodox parties 
is Israel to impose their religious policies 
against the wishes of the more tolerant 
and secular majority. 
Critics of PR electoral systems often 
invoke such instances of minor parties 
... if small parties exploit favourable bargaining 
positions to impose undiluted versions of their 
preferred policies, thus causing great distress 
among the majority, then their power is dangerous 
to the polity and difficult to defend from the 
viewpoint of democratic theory.
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imposing unpopular policies. That was 
the essence of the ‘tail wagging the dog’ 
argument against MMP. In fact, however, 
the same phenomenon occurs – but 
less transparently – under FPP. ‘Broad 
church’ parties are themselves coalitions 
of factions with differing priorities. Their 
internal politics can result in a pattern 
of ‘minorities rule’ through explicit or 
implicit logrolls. That is how economic 
liberalisers in New Zealand enacted a 
radical, frequently unpopular programme 
under one-party governments in 1984–93 
(Nagel, 1998).
Have minorities that gained 
representation under MMP been able to 
impose extreme or unpopular policies? 
As an observer who has followed New 
Zealand politics only intermittently and 
mostly from afar, I am not equipped to 
answer this question, because it requires 
detailed knowledge of policies over 
the past 16 years. Nevertheless, it is my 
impression that governments under 
MMP have usually avoided paying high 
prices for small blocs of votes, whether 
organised through separate parties or as 
factions within a major party. A possible 
exception occurred in 2010, when John 
Key’s government supported ACT’s harsh 
three-strikes criminal justice policy, 
despite the reputed disagreement of 
National’s own minister of justice, Simon 
Power, who did not manage the bill in 
Parliament.9 More often, governments 
have conspicuously succeeded in resisting 
or moderating narrowly-based demands. 
Governments led by Helen Clark refused 
to accede to the ban on genetically-
modified foods desired by the Greens, 
and allowed Tariana Turia to walk out 
of the Labour caucus and launch the 
Mäori Party rather than capitulate to her 
on the foreshore and seabed issue. When 
the Mäori Party subsequently became 
part of the National-led government in 
2008, Prime Minister Key managed to 
attract its support with concessions that 
were not too distressing to the Päkehä 
majority. Inability to prevail on their most 
cherished policies has surely contributed 
to the difficulty minor parties have had 
in maintaining electoral support (Bale 
and Bergman, 2006; Miller and Curtin, 
2011).
Although Prime Ministers Clark 
and Key have been impressively skilful 
at manoeuvring within the multi-party 
MMP environment, they have also 
benefited from favourable circumstances. 
The possibility that a small party can 
wield power out of proportion to its 
numbers is no chimera. A party’s relative 
bargaining power in a game based on 
votes can be measured using the Banzhaf 
power index, which is the number of times 
a party is critical to a winning coalition 
divided by the total number of times all 
parties are critical.10 Party A is ‘critical’ to 
a coalition when the coalition wins with 
A’s votes and loses without them. The 
relation between power and votes is not 
linear, but depends on configurations of 
voting blocs in relation to the number 
of votes required to win (typically a 
majority in legislatures). For example, if 
parties A, B and C have 51, 45 and 5 votes 
respectively, then any coalition with A 
is winning and any coalition without A 
loses. Thus, A’s Banzhaf power equals 1, 
while B and C have no power. But if just 
one seat switches so that A has 50 votes 
and B 46, while C remains at 5, then each 
party is critical to two winning coalitions 
(A to AB and AC, B to AB and BC, and 
C to AC and BC). Now all three parties 
have equal Banzhaf power (.33 each) – 
even little C.
Table 3 displays parties’ shares of 
seats and power following the six MMP 
elections. Both measures are expressed 
as decimals ranging from 0 to 1.0.11 The 
two major parties appear on the left 
of the table, while minor parties are 
to the right. There are two important 
observations to make about this history. 
First, only in 1996 did a minor party 
have a share of power that was both 
considerably greater than its seat share 
and equal to the power of a major party. 
After that first MMP election, New 
Zealand First had 23% of the bargaining 
power, which was a 64% bonus over its 
seat share and equal to the power of 
the much larger Labour caucus. New 
Zealand First’s actual power position 
was even more advantageous than 
those a priori numbers indicate. The 
power indexes in the table are based on 
all logically possible coalitions, but in 
fact certain coalitions were politically 
infeasible. The ideological gulf 
between the Alliance and ACT ruled 
out any coalition that included both 
of those parties, and the longstanding 
rivalry for power between Labour and 
National apparently prevented serious 
consideration of a grand coalition of the 
two big parties. If one computes Banzhaf 
indexes based only on the remaining, 
feasible coalitions, then New Zealand 
First had 44% of the power, more than 
either of the major parties. National 
was second with 33%, and Labour and 
the Alliance trailed with 11% each. ACT 
and United had seats, but no power. 
Admitting coalitions that included both 
National and Labour would markedly 
change those results by reducing the 
power of New Zealand First.
Second, after every election since 1996 
there was no clearly dominant power 
leader among the minor parties, and 
the multiple leaders had equal or nearly 
equal shares of power. There were two 
such leaders in 2005 (with a third not far 
behind); three in 2008 and 2011; and four 
in 1999 and 2002. Moreover, as events 
proved, in each of those five parliaments, 
multiple minor parties were sufficiently 
The parliamentary configurations Clark and Key 
faced enabled their minority governments to form 
legislative majorities with any of several partners, 
thus usually denying excessive bargaining power to 
any minor party.
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compatible with a major party to reach 
agreements of coalition, support or co-
operation.
In short, the birth trauma of MMP 
in 1996 resulted not just from Winston 
Peters’ hard bargaining, but also from 
the configuration of seats that gave him 
the power he so eagerly exploited; and 
from the unwillingness of National and 
Labour to consider a grand coalition. 
Similarly, the happier history of MMP 
after subsequent elections depended not 
only on the acumen of Helen Clark and 
John Key, but also on dispersal of seats 
and voting power among multiple minor 
parties. The parliamentary configurations 
Clark and Key faced enabled their 
minority governments to form legislative 
majorities with any of several partners, 
thus usually denying excessive bargaining 
power to any minor party.
Conditions (and choices) favouring healthy 
democracy under MMP
To sum up, after a rocky start MMP has 
had a strongly positive performance as 
judged by several tests from contemporary 
democratic theory. Parliamentary 
majorities have been based on electoral 
majorities or near-majorities. The party of 
the median voter has always been a party 
of government or, in one instance, a party 
allied with the government. All parties, 
and the Mäori minority, have participated 
in or influenced governments a significant 
share of the time; and no party has been 
perpetually in power. Minor parties have 
influenced legislation, but have seldom 
been able to impose polices that were 
strongly objectionable to a majority of 
voters.
Understanding the reasons for 
such favourable outcomes may help to 
perpetuate them in the future. I suggest 
that four interdependent conditions help 
account for the health of New Zealand’s 
democracy under MMP: (a) a high 
degree of proportionality; (b) numerous 
minor parties in Parliament; (c) minority 
governments; and (d) the absence of 
pariah parties.
Proportionality
Consistently majoritarian outcomes 
– legislative majorities supported by 
electoral majorities and median-voter 
support for a party of government – 
depend on minimal deviations from 
proportionality between parties’ seats and 
votes. Use of a PR formula and MMP’s 
branding as a ‘proportional’ system do 
not guarantee highly proportional results, 
because the 5% threshold can easily result 
in numerous ‘wasted’ votes. Two initially 
under-appreciated features of New 
Zealand’s version of MMP have lessened 
the impact of that threshold. These are, of 
course, the retention of Mäori electorates 
and the alternative threshold which allows 
any party winning an electorate seat to 
share proportionally in the allocation of 
list seats. On four occasions, minor parties 
that received less than 5% of the party vote 
achieved representation because they won 
Mäori electorates; and in six instances 
(marked by asterisks in Table 3) minor 
parties won list seats because they won a 
general electorate. 
Multiple minor parties
Proportionality, aided by the two factors 
just mentioned, has contributed to the 
presence in Parliament of multiple minor 
parties, ranging from a low of four in 1996, 
through five in 1999, 2002 and 2008, to six 
in 2005 and 2011. Permissive electoral rules 
alone do not guarantee that minor parties 
will win seats. Also important has been the 
societal potential for multiple cross-cutting 
issue dimensions and the willingness 
of politicians to exploit some of them. 
Before the first MMP election, I predicted 
that the dominant left–right dimension 
by itself would probably support only two 
parties in the long run, and that the staying 
power of the cleavage between economic 
liberalisers and interventionists (which 
had spawned three new parties) was 
limited (Nagel, 1994; Curtin and Miller, 
2010). The withering away of the Alliance/
Progressives and ACT has confirmed that 
prediction. By the same logic, would-be 
centrist parties have prospered only by 
also campaigning on one or more cross-
cutting issues, such as immigration and 
corruption for New Zealand First or 
social conservatism for United Future 
New Zealand in 2002. Other minor parties 
have defined themselves by stands on 
more enduring cross-cutting dimensions, 
post-materialism and ethnicity. Thus the 
Greens have been present in every MMP 
parliament (including as a constituent 
party of the Alliance in 1996), and minor 
parties depending on Mäori voters and 
electorates have won seats in four of the 
six MMP elections.
Minority governments
Tempted by the bait of seemingly complete 
control that an absolute majority confers, 
a party can be lured into paying a high 
price to swing voters or to a pivotal minor 
party. The facade of majority government 
Table 3: Parties’ shares of seats and power following MMP elections
National Labour ACT United NZ First Green Alliance/
Progressive
Ma-ori Mana
1996
Seats .37 .31 .07 .01 .14 – .11 – –
Power .39 .23 .08 0 .23 – .08 – –
1999
Seats .33 .41 .08 .01 .04* .06 .08 – –
Power .17 .41 .10 .01 .10 .10 .12 – –
2002
Seats .23 .43 .08 .07 .11 .08 .02* – –
Power .06 .71 .06 .04 .06 .06 .01 – –
2005
Seats .40 .41 .02* .02* .06 .05* .01 .03 –
Power .24 .31 .03 .05 .15 .12 .02 .08 –
2008
Seats .48 .35 .04* .01 0 .07 .01 .04 –
Power .64 .09 .09 0 – .09 0 .09 –
2011
Seats .49 .28 .01 .01 .07 .12 – .02 .01
Power .73 .05 .02 .02 .05 .05 – .05 .02
*Party was awarded list seats because of an electorate victory, although it received less than 5% of the party vote.
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too often conceals a logrolled reality of 
minorities rule over specific policies. 
Paradoxically, minority governments are 
more likely to deliver true majority rule, 
because they can form ad hoc coalitions 
one issue at a time, thus enacting laws 
that are likely to conform to the wishes 
of the median voter on each separate 
policy dimension. Since 1999, New 
Zealand’s major parties have been wise 
in not pushing too hard to form majority 
coalitions, and their leaders have been 
skilful in managing the intricate multi-
party dance of legislation. They could not 
have succeeded, however, if there were 
not multiple potential partners available. 
If a minority government had only one 
route to a legislative majority, the party 
or parties that controlled that route could 
exploit their power, even if they stayed 
outside government. The existence of 
several minor parties, many of them with 
equivalent legislative power, has given 
every MMP ministry after the first at least 
two different paths to a parliamentary 
majority.
Absence of pariahs
After Weimar Germany, the most oft-cited 
examples of dysfunctional PR systems are 
post-war Italy and contemporary Israel. 
Although Italy is usually invoked because 
of its unstable, short-lived cabinets, at 
a deeper level it suffered from too much 
stability. Italy’s largest party, the Christian 
Democrats (DC), was perpetually in 
government, surrounded by a revolving 
cast of smaller parties. Assured of 
power, Christian Democrat legislators 
became egregiously corrupt, resulting in 
scandals that led to their party’s demise 
and the replacement of PR in 1993 by 
a rather unsuccessful (and short-lived) 
mixed-member majoritarian system 
(supplementary member, in New Zealand 
parlance). In Israel, as noted earlier, the 
problem has been the excessive power 
wielded by small parties representing the 
ultra-orthodox religious minority. Both 
the Italian and Israeli failures of PR have 
depended on a sometimes overlooked 
cause: the presence in each country’s 
legislature of significant pariah parties. 
In Italy, the Communist Party (PCI) 
commanded the second largest bloc of 
seats, ranging from 19% to 36%, but 
none of the democratic parties would 
contemplate entering a coalition with 
them. Without Communist votes, it 
was arithmetically impossible to form a 
legislative majority that did not include 
the Christian Democrats, so the latter 
were assured a large share of power 
(Gambetta and Warner, 2004). In Israel, 
the continuing excessive power of ultra-
orthodox parties results in part from the 
same cause. The Knesset typically includes 
several small Arab parties, which usually 
win 5–10% of seats, but other parties 
have been unwilling to depend on votes 
from these non-Zionist parties for fear 
of provoking a backlash among Jewish 
voters.12 Therefore, major parties often 
have no alternative but to deal with the 
ultra-orthodox, who frequently occupy 
the pivotal position when governments 
must be formed. Thus the presence 
of significant pariah parties directly 
manifests one democratic failure – the 
existence of a permanent minority – and 
indirectly causes two others – perpetually 
governing parties and excessively powerful 
minor parties. The success of MMP in 
New Zealand has resulted in part from the 
absence of any perpetual pariah, although 
New Zealand First (or, more precisely, 
its leader) has at times held that dubious 
distinction vis-à-vis one or the other of 
the major parties, which helps explain its 
last-place position in Table 2.
Practical implications
I will conclude with implications of 
the preceding analysis for the Electoral 
Commission as it reviews the finer points 
of MMP, and for political leaders as they 
continue to operate within an MMP system.
The first question on the Electoral 
Commission’s review agenda is whether 
to change either of the alternative 
thresholds a party must reach to be 
included in the allocation of list seats. 
As I have tried to show, a high degree 
of proportionality is important not just 
to serve representational values, but 
also to achieve majoritarian goals: a 
government supported by a majority of 
voters, a governing party that represents 
the median voter, and specific policies 
acceptable to majorities that may – and 
should – differ from issue to issue. The 
higher the threshold, the less the likelihood 
that a PR system will actually deliver a 
high degree of proportionality. Thus far, 
New Zealand’s alternative threshold of an 
electorate victory has partially offset the 
rather high main threshold of 5% of the 
party vote. If the Electoral Commission 
decides to eliminate the electorate route 
to list seats (and there are reasons to do 
so that this article has not addressed), 
then I would recommend lowering the 
party vote threshold to 3%.
To political leaders, especially of the 
major parties, the main implication of 
this analysis is simply to keep up the good 
work. After early learning pains, they have 
shown ingenuity and skill in managing 
the tricky processes of government-
formation and legislation in a multi-
party environment. Still, it may be worth 
underscoring three guidelines that can 
contribute to continued success. First, 
minority governments are a good thing, 
especially if the alternative is to make 
binding commitments that give too much 
power to minorities, whether voting blocs 
in the electorate or parties in parliament. 
Second, room to manoeuvre, and thus to 
serve democratic ends, increases when 
no party is treated as a pariah. A party 
may arise that is truly beyond the pale – 
anti-democratic, racist, or opposed to the 
continued existence of New Zealand as a 
nation – but, short of such extremes, it is 
The success of MMP in New Zealand has resulted 
in part from the absence of any perpetual pariah, 
although New Zealand First (or, more precisely, its 
leader) has at times held that dubious distinction 
vis-à-vis one or the other of the major parties...
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best to look beyond difficult personalities 
and personal animosities to the greater 
good. Third, if an anti-system party 
does arise, or if a minor party excessively 
exploits an unusually strong power 
position, then major parties always 
have the recourse of putting aside their 
historic rivalry by forming a temporary 
grand coalition.
1 The more accurate term for FPP is ‘single-member plurality’ 
(SMP), but I will follow the labels used in the referendum.
2 Indeed, as New Zealanders saw in 1978 and 1981, it is 
possible under FPP for a party to win a majority of seats even 
though it receives less than a plurality of votes nationwide.
3 Over-representation is calculated by dividing the party’s 
percentage of seats by its percentage of votes, subtracting 
one, and then multiplying by 100. All votes and seats 
reported in this article are from the website of the New 
Zealand Electoral Commission or the commission’s printed 
compendia.
4 A minimal majority commands a majority of MPs, but 
includes no party whose votes are not essential to pass a bill.
5 In 2008 there was one other legislative minimal majority 
– National and ACT, with a combined 48.6% of party 
votes. United Future also had a support agreement with 
National, but its single vote was never essential, as long as 
all members of National and one of the other co-operating 
parties voted for a measure. In 1999 there was only one 
minimal majority – the Labour–Alliance coalition plus the 
Greens; but the minority coalition could also reach a majority 
with the help of New Zealand First, with which it had no 
formal agreement. The 2002 Labour–Progressive government 
could prevail with the aid of either United Future or the 
Greens. In 2005, the Labour–Progressive government could 
pass bills with the support of NZ First plus United Future, or 
NZ First plus the Greens. Minimal winning coalitions in the 
current Parliament consist of National plus the Mäori Party or 
National plus ACT plus United Future.
6 To determine the party of the median voter, first adjust party 
votes to sum to 100% by correcting for fringe parties that 
received some votes but are not listed in Figure 2. Then 
start with the party on the extreme left and cumulate party 
votes until the total exceeds 50%. The party that puts the 
total over 50% represents the median voter. Starting at the 
extreme right gives the same result as long as there is no 
exact 50-50 division. It might seem that the median voter 
test is merely another way of saying that the government 
rests on a numerical majority of votes, but that is not 
necessarily so. If an odd-bedfellows coalition formed between 
parties on the left and right wings, the party representing 
the median voter would not be included, even though the 
electoral support base of the government could exceed 50%.
7 Besides its idiosyncratic economic doctrines, Social Credit in 
its earlier days had appeals that could be characterised as 
right-wing, and it always depended heavily on protest voters, 
but by the 1970s it had ‘evolved into a mildly reformist 
centre party’ (Miller, 1985, p.212).
8 The parties of Mäori MPs with influence thus defined and 
their number of MPs compared with the number of Mäori 
electorates are as follows: 1996–98, NZ First (5 of 5); 
1998–99, Mauri Pacific (3 of 5); 1999–2002, Labour (6 of 
6); 2002–04, Labour (7 of 7); 2004–05, Labour (6 of 7); 
2005–08, Labour (3 of 7); 2008–11, Mäori Party (5 of 7); 
2011– , Mäori Party (3 of 7).
9 I owe this example to Jonathan Boston.
10 Another well-known voting power measure is the Shapley-
Shubik index, which gives results generally similar but not 
identical to the Banzhaf index. See Felsenthal and Machover 
(1998).
11 Calculators for Banzhaf indexes are available at a number 
of sites on the internet. I used the one provided by Temple 
University at http://www.math.temple.edu/~cow/bpi.html. In 
using Table 3, readers should note that, unlike seat shares, 
shares of power are not additive. To use the example in the 
text, if B and C coalesced, their combined power would be 
1.0, not .67.
12 In New Zealand, according to Sorrenson (1986, pp.B-45-6), 
the dependence of Peter Fraser’s Labour government in 
1946–49 on the votes of the four Mäori MPs was probably 
‘a significant factor’ in its defeat. That dependence ‘was 
ceaselessly panned in the pro-National press’, as in cartoons 
that “showed Fraser forever pandering to a grass skirted 
Mäori mandate”. The consistent influence of Mäori MPs over 
MMP mandate governments shows how far New Zealand has 
come.
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